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MORAN AND THE POISON PILL:
A TARGET'S SAVIOR?
The recent increase in corporate takeovers' has prompted many corporate
boards to adopt "poison pill" 2 stock purchase rights plans as a defense
against hostile' tender offers. 4 Under a typical poison pill rights plan, a
corporation distributes the rights (or "warrants") as a dividend on the
1. See Wall St. I., Jan. 1, 1986, at 6B, col. I (chroniciling corporate takeover activity in
1985); Bus. WK., Mar. 4, 1985 at 80 (discussing recent proliferation of corporate takeovers).
2. See generally Chittur, Wall Street's Teddy Bear: The "Poison Pill" As A Takeover
Defense, 2 J. CORP. L. 25, 25-40 (1985). "Poison pill" refers to an antitakeover mechanism that
has garnered recent popularity among companies wishing to protect themselves against unfriendly
takeovers. Id. at 25-26. Poison pills generally take the form of dividends of either preferred stock
or stock purchase rights. See id. at 26-40 (discussing two main versions of poison pill); infra notes
12-22 and accompanying text (summarizing characteristics of poison pill stock purchase rights).
A poison pill generally contains conversion or "flip-over" features that a board of directors de-
signs to deter unsolicited takeovers. See Katcher, Chapnick, Finley & Ferleger, Mergers and Ac-
quisitions: Developments in Defensive Tactics 1985, in 1 PLI, 17H ANNUAL lNsTrruTE OF SEcuRms
REGULATION 408-25 (S. Friedman, C. Nathan & H. Pitt eds. 1985) (PLI Corporate Law & Prac-
tice Handbook Series No. 498) (discussing variations of poison pills as antitakeover mechanisms)
[hereinafter cited as Katcher & Chapnick]; infra notes 21, 59 and accompanying text (discussing
flip-over feature of purchase rights plan).
3. See M. LPTON & E. STEINBERGER, 1 TAKEOVERS& FREEZEOUTS § 1.01[l] (1986). A hos-
tile tender offer is an offer for a company's stock that the offeror makes directly to the share-
holders of a target company, without the approval of the target company's board of directors.
Id. A "target" company is the subject or potential subject of an offer to purchase by another
acquiring person or group. See Troubh, Characteristics of Target Companies, 32 Bus. LAw. 1301,
1301-04 (1977) (discussing traits of target companies).
4. See Fogelson, Some Recent Defensive Strategies in Corporate Takeovers, in I PLI,
HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1985 191-208 (D. Block & H. Pitt eds. 1985) (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 474) (discussing poison pill stock purchase rights
dividend plan as defensive strategy against takeover attempts). Corporations that have adopted
poison pill plans include Household International, Inc., Colgate Palmolive Company, Owens-
Illinois, Inc., and Crown Zellerbach Corporation. See Household International, Inc. and Harris
Trust and Savings Bank Rights Agreement (Aug. 14, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Rights Plan],
reprinted in SHA REPELLENTS AND GOLDEN PARAcHuTEs: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTIIONER
422.59-422.89 (R. Winter, M. Stumpf & G. Hawkins eds. 1984) [hereinafter cited as SHARK
REPELLENTS]; Colgate-Palmolive Letter to Shareholders (Oct. 12, 1984) (informing Colgate-Pal-
molive stockholders of newly declared common stock purchase rights dividend) [hereinafter cited
as Colgate-Palmolive Letter], reprinted in 2 PLI, HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
1985 691-92 (D. Block & H. Pitts eds. 1985) (PLI Corporate law & Practice Handbook Series
No. 475); Owens-Illinois Letter to Shareholders (Sept. 10, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Owens-Illinois
Letter], reprinted in 2 PLI, HosTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1985 693-95 (D. Block
& H. Pitts eds. 1985) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 475); Crown Zeller-
bach Corporation and The Bank of California, N.A., Rights Agreement (July 19, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Crown Zellerbach Rights Agreement], reprinted in SAK REPELLENTs, supra, at 417-422.18.
Other companies that have adopted poison pill rights plans include TRW, Inc., Annheuser-Busch
Cos., International Paper Co., PPG Industries, Inc., Gillette Co. and Tambrands, Inc. See Wall
St. J., Jan. 8, 1986, at 6, col. 2 (discussing recent popularity of poison pill plans).
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outstanding shares of the issuing company's common stock.' The rights
entitle a shareholder of a company that has adopted a poison pill rights plan
to purchase common or preferred stock of that company. 6 The poisonous or
defensive quality of the rights dividend is that, in the event of a merger, the
rights "flip over" and authorize a rightsholder to purchase stock of an
acquiring company at a substantially discounted price. 7 The purpose of the
flip-over feature of the rights is to deter hostile tender offers by rendering
acquisition of the target company prohibitively expensive for a potential
acquiror.8 In addition, a rights plan may encourage a potential acquiror at
least to consult with a target company's board should the warrants not deter
a takeover attempt. 9 To ensure that the rights do not interfere with a
favorable negotiated merger, the issuing corporation normally may redeem
the rights at a nominal price.' 0
While those companies that have adopted poison pill warrants have
tailored the warrants to suit the companies' individual needs, most purchase
rights plans are similar in structure." Under a typical rights plan, a company
5. See Owens-Illinois Letter, supra note 4, at 693 (Owens-Illinois board of directors de-
clared dividend of preferred stock purchase rights).
6. See id. at 694 (Owens-Illinois rights allow stockholders to purchase one one-hundredth
share of Owens-Illinois preferred stock); Crown Zellerbach Rights Agreement, supra note 4, at
418 (Crown Zellerbach rights entitle shareholders to purchase one share of Crown Zellerbach
common stock).
7. See Fogelson, supra note 4, at 194 (upon merger of iarget corporation into acquiring
company, each right entitles rightholder to purchase stock of acquiring company); infra notes
21, 59 and accompanying text (discussing flip-over provision of purchase rights plan).
8. See SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 4, at 395 (poison pill rights to purchase acquiror's
stock at discounted price render acquisition of target financially unfeasible for potential acqui-
ror). Poison pill stock purchase rights substantially increase the acquisition cost of a target com-
pany because the acquiror will suffer an equity dilution in the event of a merger with the target.
See infra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing dilution of raider's equity caused by rights
plan).
9. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1066 (Del. Ch. 1985) (directors
design rights plan to create uncertainty for potential acquiror); M. L'TON & E. STEINBERGER, supra
note 3, § 6.0313], at 6-44 - 6-45 (complexity of rights plans can deter raider from proceeding
unilaterally with tender offer for target).
10. See Fogelson, supra note 4, at 196 (discussing redemption feature of purchase rights);
M. LIPTON & E. SaEtNBERGR, supra note 3, § 6.0313], at 6-46 (redemption feature of rights prevents
rights from interfering with friendly negotiated merger). The redemption feature of the rights
allows a target company's board to withdraw the rights at a minimal expense in the event of an
offer that the board deems favorable to the corporation, but the rights lose their redeemability
after a 20% acquisition of the target's stock. See Crown Zellerbach Rights Agreement, supra
note 4, at 422.15 (company may redeem rights for $.50 per right prior to 20% acquisition of
company's stock). Thus, the rights could interfere with a negotiated merger after a 20% acqui-
sition. M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 3, § 6.0313], at 6-46.
11. See, e.g., Household International, Inc. Summary of Rights to Purchase Series A Junior
Preferred Participating Preferred Stock (Aug. 14, 1984) (explaining Household Rights Agree-
ment) [hereinafter cited as Household Summary of Rights], reprinted in SHARK REPELLENTS, supra
note 4, at 422.96; Colgate-Palmolive Letter, supra note 4, at 691-92 (summary of Colgate-Palmolive
poison pill rights plan); Owens-Illinois Letter, supra note 4, at 693-95 (outlining Owens-Illinois
poison pill); see also infra notes 12-24 and accompanying text (discussing basic structure of typical
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distributes a dividend of one stock purchase right for each share of outstand-
ing common stock.' 2 Each right entitles a holder to purchase, upon payment
of an exercise price, 3 a certain amount of preferred or common stock of the
issuing corporation. 4 The exercise price of the warrants, however, is com-
monly two hundred to three hundred percent of the market price of the
rights plan).
Poison pill stock purchase rights are actually a variation of another type of poison pill that
Lenox, Inc. (Lenox) initially issued in a takeover contest with Brown-Forman Distillers Corpo-
ration (Brown-Forman). See Wall St. J., June 16, 1983, at 2, col. 2 (highlighting takeover battle
between Lenox and Brown-Forman). Instead of issuing a dividend of stock purchase rights, Lenox
distributed a dividend of preferred stock that was convertible into voting common stock of any
company that acquired Lenox. See SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 4, at 395-96 (discussing Lenox
poison pill preferred stock); Chittur, supra note 2, at 27-30 (discussing Lenox poison pill plan
and Lenox' takeover battle against Brown-Forman). The conversion ratio of Lenox preferred
stock into an acquiror's common stock ensured Lenox stockholders of receiving an acquiror's
common stock in an amount not less than the equivalent of the price received in the initial stage
of a two-tier tender offer. SHARK REPiLENTS, supra note 4, at 396. See also infra note 25 (dis-
cussing two-tier tender offer). Lenox ultimately withdrew its poison pill and accepted Brown-
Forman's offer to purchase any and all of Lenox stock for $90 cash per share. Wall St. J., June
29, 1983, at 2, col. 2. After the Lenox - Brown-Forman battle, several large, publicly held cor-
porations instituted similar plans. See Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-
Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1964, 1964 n.2 (1984) (de-
scribing origin and subsequent use of poison pill preferred stock); see also Certificate of Desig-
nations, Preferences and Rights of $12 Cumulative Convertible Preferred Stock of Bell & Howell
Company, reprinted in Finkelstein, Antitakeover Protection Against Two-Tier and Partial Tender
Offers: The Validity of Fair Price, Mandatory Bid, and Flip-Over Provisions Under Delaware
Law. 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 291, 314-31 (1984) (poison pill preferred stock plan of Bell & Howell
Company); Memorandum Dated June 20, 1983, reprinted in 2 M. L'roN & E. STEINBERGER,
TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS H-3, H-3 - H-8 (1984) (summary of refined version of poison pill
preferred stock dividend plan).
12. See Owens-Illinois Letter, supra note 4, at 694 (Owens-Illinois declares distribution of
one right per share of outstanding common stock).
13. See Crown Zellerbach Rights Agreement, supra note 4, at 422 (shareholders entitled to
exercise rights to purchase new stock in Crown Zellerbach for $100 per right). The exercise price
in a poison pill stock purchase plan normally approximates the future market value of the issuing
company's common stock at the time the rights will expire. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,
supra note 3, § 6.03[3], at 6-45 (exercise price set in accordance with liberal estimate of stock's
future value).
14. See Owens-Illinois Letter, supra note 4, at 694 (Owens-Illinois rights entitle stockhold-
ers to purchase one one-hundredth share of Owens-Illinois preferred stock); Crown Zellerbach
Rights Agreement, supra note 4, at 418 (Crown Zellerbach rights entitle shareholders to purchase
one share of Crown Zellerbach common). The underlying stock of the issuing company in a rights
plan may be common or preferred, depending upon the sufficiency of the issuing corporation's
existing authorized stock. See Fogelson, supra note 4, at 193. If a company has sufficient au-
thorized but unissued common stock to cover the rights, the company may distribute rights to
purchase common stock through the company's board of directors. Id. If a company has an
insufficient amount of authorized common stock, the company may distribute rights to purchase
participating preferred stock provided the company has sufficient authorized "blank check" pre-
ferred stock. Id. Companies that have neither an adequate amount of authorized but unissued
common stock nor sufficient blank check preferred stock to cover the rights would need stock-
holder approval to authorize the requisite stock. Id. at 193-94.
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company's common stock.'5 The prudent shareholder, therefore, has little or
no economic incentive to exercise the shareholder's right to purchase new
stock in the issuing corporation. 6 The purchase rights remain "attached" to
the outstanding common stock until the occurrence of a triggering event. 7
For example, a purchase rights plan may provide that once a person or
group acquires twenty percent of the issuing company's outstanding common
stock, or announces an offer to acquire thirty percent of the company's
outstanding common stock, the rights detach, and the rightsholders then
may exercise the warrants and purchase stock of the issuing company.,' The
right to acquire new stock of the issuing company, however, is not the
distinguishing feature of a poison pill rights plan. 9 Rather, the principal
characteristic of a rights plan is the flip-over feature, which occurs in the
event of a merger or other business combination of the target corporation
15. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 3, §6.02[3), at 6-45 (depending upon
term of rights, exercise price may be 200 to 300% of company's stock); supra note 13 (discussing
exercise price of rights).
16. See Nat'l L.J., Mar. 25, 1985, at 15, col. 1 (recognizing economic impropriety of ex-
ercising rights to purchase new stock in issuing company). Since an issuing company bases the
exercise price of poison pill warrants on the future value of the company's stock, the present
exercise of the warrants economically is unfeasible for the rightsholder. See Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1066 (Del. Ch. 1985) (at $10,000 per share, Household's newly issued
preferred stock was unrealistic option).
17. See Fogelson, supra note 4, at 194. The warrants in a purchase rights plan are appur-
tenant to the common stock of the issuing company immediately after issuance of the rights. Id.
Thus, until a triggering event occurs, a rightsholder may not exercise the rights, but may transfer
the rights only in connection with the transfer of the holder's common stock. See Rights Plan,
supra note 4, at 422.61 (rights alienable only as attached to common stock); see also infra notes
18, 59 and accompanying text (discussing triggering events of typical rights plan).
18. See Fogelson, supra note 4, at 194 (rightsholder may exercise rights after triggering
event). The first phase of a typical poison pill stock purchase rights plan consists of distributing
a dividend of the rights. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (company distributes dividend
of one right per share of outstanding common stock). The second phase of a rights plan involves
executing a rights agreement with a third party as a rights agent. See Rights Plan, supra note 4,
at 422.59 (rights agreement between Household, Inc. and Harris Trust and Savings Bank); Crown
Zellerbach Rights Agreement, supra note 4, at 417 (rights agreement between Crown Zellerbach
Corporation and The Bank of California, N.A.). Upon the occurrence of a triggering event, the
rights agent issues a separate rights certificate evidencing the rights to each shareholder of the
issuing company. See Rights Plan, supra note 4, at 422.61. Each shareholder then may exercise
the right to purchase stock in the issuing company by surrendering the rights certificate to the
rights agent and paying a purchase price. See Crown Zellerbach Rights Agreement, supra note
4, at 418 (entitling shareholders to purchase one share of Crown Zellerbach common stock);
Owens-Illinois Letter, supra note 4, at 694 (Owens-Illinois rights allow stockholders to purchase
one one-hundredth of a share of Owens-Illinois preferred stock). In the event that an issuing
company's stockholder declines to exercise the right to purchase new stock in the issuing com-
pany, the stockholder then would be able to purchase shares of any acquiring company in the
event of a merger. See infra notes 21, 59 and accompanying text (discussing flip-over feature of
poison pill stock purchase rights).
19. See Nat'l L.J., Mar. 25, 1985, at 15, col. I (ability of rightsholders to purchase shares
of issuing company's stock at exercise price has minimal practical significance).
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into another company.20 Upon the consummation of a merger or other
combination, the flip-over feature entitles each rightsholder to purchase
an amount of the acquiror's common stock equivalent to the market value
of twice the exercise price of each right.2' Thus, if the exercise price of
a right is one hundred dollars, and the market value of the acquiror's
stock at the time of the merger is fifty dollars per share, each right en-
titles the holder of that right to receive four shares, or two hundred dol-
lars worth of the acquiror's stock upon payment of the one hundred
dollar exercise price.2 Because the acquiring entity must offer its own
equity at a tremendous discount23 to rightsholders of the target company,
the resulting dilution of an acquiror's capital will be immediate and po-
tentially devastating.24
By effectively deterring hostile corporate raiders, a poison pill rights plan
may serve a valuable purpose for shareholders in a market that is permeated
20. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 3, § 6.0313], at 6-40 (discussing flip-over
feature of rights); infra notes 21, 59 and accompanying text (same).
21. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 3, § 6.0313], at 6-40. In the event of
a takeover, the outstanding poison pill stock purchase rights flip over and enable a rightsholder
to purchase the acquiror's equity at one-half of the stock's market value. Id, See also Crown
Zellerbach Rights Agreement, supra note 4, at 422.8-22.9 (entitling holders of outstanding rights
to buy any acquiror's common stock at 50% discount); Owens-Illinois Letter, supra note 4, at
694 (rights modified upon merger to allow rightsholder to purchase $250 worth of acquiror's
stock for $125).
22. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 3, §6.0313], at 6-45 (typical rights plan
allows rightsholders to purchase acquiror's stock at one-half market price).
23. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (poison pill warrants entitle holders to
purchase stock of acquiror at 50% of stock's value in event of merger).
24. See Chittur, supra note 2, at 40 (describing dilutive effect of poison pill rights). The
dilutive effect of poison pill warrants on an acquiror's equity is the significant deterrent aspect
of a purchase rights plan. Id. For example, assume that acquiror (A) commences a tender offer
for 25% of target (T) company's 100 million shares of outstanding common stock at $50 per
share (the market value of T's stock is $40 per share). A can lock up 25 million shares of T for
$1.25 billion (25 million shares at $50 per share). A's purchase, however, will trigger T's rights
plan. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (acquiring 20% of target company's stock or
announcing intent to acquire 30% interest in target company will trigger rights). Assuming that
the exercise price of the rights is $100 per right, if A consummates a merger with T, T's rights-
holders (representing 75 million shares of remaining common stock in T) can receive $15 billion
worth of A's equity for a cumulative exercise price of $7.5 billion. A, therefore, would suffer a
$7.5 billion dilution of equity in acquiring T, a company with a market value of $4 billion.
Although the dilution of A's equity decreases as the amount of stock in the tender offer
increases, the deterrent effect of poison pill warrants remains substantial. See Chuttur, supra note
2, at 40 (dilution of acquiror's equity is related inversely to amount of target's stock for which
acquiror tenders). For example, A can ameliorate the dilutive effect of poison pill rights by tend-
ering for a greater number of the target's shares. Id. If A tenders for 90% of T's outstanding
common stock, A can secure 90 million shares of T for $4.5 billion (90 million shares times $50
per share tender offer). If A carries out a merger with T, the rights then would enable the re-
maining shareholders to exercise a cumulative price of $1 billion (10 million shares times $100
exercise price) and purchase $2 billion worth of A's common stock. A, therefore, would suffer
a $1 billion equity dilution, as opposed to the $7.5 billion dilution encountered if A tendered for
only 25% of T's shares.
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by coercive two-tier 5 and partial"6 tender offers. 21 A purchase rights plan also
may allow stockholders to reject a hostile tender offer without fear of an un-
fair "freeze out" in a back end merger because an acquiring company would
suffer a harmful dilution of equity in the second step merger phase of a two-
tier or partial tender offer.2 ' Finally, a rights plan may provide incentive for
a potential acquiror to negotiate with a target's board of directors prior to
commencing an offer for the target and thus may allow the board to procure
more favorable terms for a target's shareholders.
29
While poison pill warrants may protect stockholders in certain instances,
rights plans may not always serve the best interests of stockholders.30 For
example, rights plans may deprive stockholders of the potential benefits of
hostile tender offers."a In addition to providing a premium stock price to
the shareholders of a target, a hostile tender offer or the threat of a hostile
tender offer is an important monitoring device that provides management
with a real incentive to operate a corporation efficiently and without self-
25. See D. COMMONS, TENDER OFFER: Tan SNEAK ATrACK IN CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 149
(1985). A two-tier tender offer is an offer to purchase a controlling interest in a target company
at a premium cash price and the remainder of the target's shares at a lower price of cash or
securities. Id. By offering an above-market price for an initial controlling interest in a target, an
acquiring corporation can induce a target's shareholders to tender shares quickly to receive the
higher price per share. See Note, supra note 11, at 1966 (two-tier tender offer coercively induces
stockholders to tender shares).
26. See Finkelstein, supra note 11, at 291. A partial tender offer is an offer to purchase an
interest in a target company that will give the offeror control of the company, but the offer is
for less than all of the corporation's shares. Id.
27. See Fogelson, supra note 4, at 192 (enumerating protections afforded stockholders by
poison pill rights plan). The coercive effect of two-tier and partial tender offers upon a target's
shareholders is substantial. See generally Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate
Freezeouts, 87 YAIu L.J. 1354, 1360-62 (1978) (discussing coercive nature of two-tier bids). By
loading the front end of a two-tier offer with a premium cash payment, an offeror can drive
stockholders into tendering shares and "squeeze out" remaining shareholders in a second step
merger for a lower cash price or securities exchange. See Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Re-
sponses and Directors' Responsibilities-An Update, 40 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1412 (1985) (front end
loaded tender offers coerce stockholders into tendering during initial phase of offer). A partial
tender offer also induces stockholders to tender their shares quickly since those shareholders who
refuse to tender in the initial offer will be left at the mercy of the majority shareholder if the
merger succeeds. Note, supra note 11, at 1967. Moreover, upon acquiring a controlling interest
in a target company, an acquiror with limited financial resources often finances a second step
merger through the sale or "bust-up" of the target's assets. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,
supra note 3, at § 1.04[8] (discussing bootstrap takeover offers).
28. See Fogelson, supra note 4, at 192 (rights plan designed to reduce coercive element of
two-tier and partial tender offers); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text (rights require
offeror to sell equity at discounted price if offeror effectuates merger and target's stockholders
exercise rights); supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing dilutive effect of warrants).
29. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (rights plan may act as bargaining device for
target).
30. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (rights plans may deprive shareholders of
benefits from tender offers).
31. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (Illinois statute that may block out-
of-state tender offers deprives shareholders of opportunity to sell stock at premium); Easterbrook
& Fischel, The Proper Role of Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv.
1161, 1173-74 (1981) (discussing benefits of tender offers); Gilson, A Structural Approach to
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interest. 2 As a result, stockholders have challenged boards of directors'
decisions to adopt poison pills as a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties
to the stockholders to exercise care and loyalty in managing the corporation.33
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 842-
45 (1981) (discussing advantages of tender offers).
32. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 31, at 1172 (tender offers enable prospective
acquirors to keep watch over corporate management). Courts and commentators have noted that
hostile tender offers may benefit shareholders. See supra note 31 (authorities examining benefits
of hostile tender offers). Since the purpose of a hostile tender offer is to persuade a target's
shareholders to tender stock to the offeror, the offeror normally offers a price that is well above
the market value of the target's stock. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 31, at 1173 (target's
shareholders receive premium price through tender offer process). In addition, a successful tender
offer can result in the discharge of inefficient management that has caused the market to under-
estimate the true value of the target's stock. See id. (prospective bidders acquire undervalued
companies and improve management). Tender offers, therefore, may compel incumbent man-
agement to perform efficiently so that stock prices remain high. See Gilson, supra note 31, at
844 (tender offers significantly restrain management inefficiency). Finally, hostile tender offers
effectively may enable outside acquirors to replace self-dealing incumbent management if the
market value of the company's stock accurately reflects the improper activities of existing man-
agement. Id.
33. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); infra notes
129-34 (discussing Norlin). Courts and commentators have divided directors' fiduciary duties into
a duty of care and duty of loyalty. See Norlin v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir.
1984) (two prongs of directors' obligations to corporations and shareholders are duty of care and
duty of loyalty); Harrington, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: The Legal Propriety of Defenses
Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 977, 987 (1983) (traditional formulation of
fiduciary obligations split into duty of care and duty of loyalty). The duty of care obligates a
director to perform managerial tasks in good faith and with the care that a reasonably prudent
person in a similar situation would exercise under similar circumstances. See Norlin, 744 F.2d at
264 (articulating duty of care under New York law); MODEL BusiNESS COR'ORATION ACT § 35
(Supp. 1977) (director's duty of care). In evaluating a board of directors' duty of care, courts
have developed a policy of judicial deference commonly known as the business judgment rule.
See Auerbach v. Bennet, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 632-33, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001-02, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920,
928 (1979) (business judgment rule applies when shareholder has charged board with breach of
duty of care). The business judgment rule provides that a court will not interfere with the business
judgment of a board of directors unless the court finds bad faith or self-dealing. See Arsht, The
Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93, 111-12 (1979) (comprehensive state-
ment of business judgment rule). The basic premise of the business judgment rule is that courts
are reluctant to intervene in matters that are necessarily business determinations regarding cor-
porate affairs. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (courts will not
disturb business decisions of directors regarding corporate affairs). Concerning business deci-
sions, therefore, courts afford directors a presumption that the board made an informed decision
and acted in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of
the company. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
In the area of corporate takeovers, courts often have accorded the protection of the busi-
ness judgment rule to boards that have sought to forestall a takeover by implementing defensive
mechanisms. See, e.g., Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 723-24 (5th Cir.
1984) (applying Texas law, court upheld use of "springing" warrants under business judgment
rule); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.) (upholding target's acquisition
program designed to create antitrust obstacle for acquiror under business judgment rule), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980) (ac-
cording business judgment rule to board's refusal to tender stock to plaintiff shareholders), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
In challenging a director's action, the plaintiff normally bears the initial burden of rebut-
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Since poison pills substantially may deter hostile tender offers or force
ting the presumption of the business judgment rule and showing a breach of the director's fi-
duciary duties. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 296 (7th Cir.) (burden on
plaintiff to show bad faith, self-dealing, or fraud to rebut presumption of business judgment
rule), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985)
(plaintiff must rebut presumption that board made informed business decision). Once the plain-
tiff has rebutted the presumption of the business judgment rule, the burden shifts to the director
to prove the reasonableness of the board's action. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). But see Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (board initially must show reasonableness of defensive tactic before
court will accord presumptions of business judgment rule because of board's inherent conflict of
interest in takeover situations); infra note 98 (discussing Unocals enhanced duty under business
judgment rule for directors in takover situations); see also Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500
A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (initial burden of showing reasonableness lies with directors in con-
text of adopting defensive mechanism); infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (discussing Moran
and threshold duty of directors).
In addition to a duty of care, directors also owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corpo-
ration and its shareholders. Norlin, 744 F.2d at 264. The duty of loyalty requires a director to
demonstrate the substantive fairness of a transaction to the corporation and its shareholders once
a plaintiff initially has shown a conflict of interest in the challenged transaction. See id. (director
must show that transaction was fair if plaintiff establishes director's self-interest); Moore, The
"Interested" Director or Officer Transaction, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 674, 676 (1979) (discussing
fairness standard). Courts, however, often have not adhered to a general fairness analysis in
takeover situations involving conflicts of interest. See Harrington, supra, at 990 (noting reluctance
of courts to apply fairness standard in takeover cases); Note, supra note 11, at 1969 (courts do
not apply fairness standard in takeover context). Rather, courts have applied, or have purported
to apply, a "primary purpose" test instead of a substantive fairness standard to board transac-
tions in takeover contexts that involve a conflict of interest. See Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157,
1161-62 (Ist Cir. 1977) (applying primary purpose test); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504,
199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964) (board action taken for primary purpose of entrenchment is improper).
Under the primary purpose test, a court determines whether directors primarily acted to effec-
tuate a proper corporate purpose or to perpetuate the directors' management position. Heil, 567
F.2d at 1161-62. Theoretically, the business judgment rule only applies to challenges to a direc-
tor's fiduciary duty of care, and thus is not appropriate in conflict of interest or primary purpose
situations. See Norlin, 744 F.2d at 265 (business judgment rule governs only situations in which
no conflict of interest exists); Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-40 (7th Cir. 1979) (business
judgment rule inapplicable to situations in which management has personal interest); Harrington,
supra, at 988 (business judgment rule does not apply to managerial conflicts of interest). Several
courts, however, have applied the business judgment rule in conjunction with the primary pur-
pose test. See Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1980)
(applying both primary purpose test and business judgment rule); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629
F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980) (court accorded directors' decision to reject financially beneficial
offer protection of business judgment rule since plaintiff failed to show entrenchment was direc-
tor's primary purpose), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Good-
rich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Il. 1969) (court failed to make distinction between primary
purpose test and business judgment rule); see also Harrington, supra, at 991-1001 (discussing
judicial confusion regarding duty of loyalty and business judgment rule); H. Pitt, Fiduciary Du-
ties in Control-Contests, in I PLI, HosTnM BATrLEs FOR COR'ORxE CONTROL 1985 46-60 (D. Block
& H. Pitt eds. 1985) (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 474) (discussing ju-
dicial application of primary purpose test). Commentators have noted ihat courts interchangea-
bly have applied the business judgment rule and the primary purpose test and have concluded
that, in practice, the two standards produce the same result. See Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 124 (1979) (while courts may purport to apply separate
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outside bidders to seek board approval,3 4 a board of directors that adopts a
poison pill effectively may exercise control over a tender offer that an offeror
made directly to shareholders. 35 In addition, a board may adopt a poison
pill primarily to entrench the position of existing management, which would
breach the board's fiduciary duty of loyalty to the stockholders. 36 Finally,
state corporation law may not authorize the adoption of a poison pill that
significantly redistributes voting power without stockholder approval.
3 7
Despite the potential adverse effects of poison pills on shareholders'
interests, previous litigation involving poison pill warrants 38 had failed to
address adequately the validity of a board of directors' adoption of a rights
plan until Moran v. Household International, Inc.3 ' In Moran, the Delaware
Supreme Court upheld the adoption of a rights plan by the board of directors
of Household International, Inc. (Household) on the grounds that the
business judgment rule4O protected Household's adoption of a rights plan as
a prospective takeover defense.
41
In Moran, the Household directors had become concerned about House-
hold's vulnerability as a takeover target. 42 While unaware of any specific,
primary purpose test, cases turn on whether courts believed that directors acted in good faith or
on reasonable basis); Note, supra note 11, at 1970 (courts' application of business judgment rule
and primary purpose test are indistinguishable).
34. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing warrants' ability to facilitate ne-
gotiation and deter unsolicited takeover bids).
35. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del. Ch. 1985) (Household
stock purchase plan allows board to act as primary negotiator of partial tender offers); Nat'l
L.J., Mar. 25, 1985, at 16, col. 1 (significant argument against poison pill warrants is that board
obtains sole control over hostile tender offer).
36. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 1984) (board breached
duty of loyalty by issuing stock plan that gave board voting control of company).
37. See infra notes 129-41 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which boards have
adopted defensive mechanisms that overstepped statutory authorization).
38. See Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1984)
(upholding issuance of "springing" warrants under business judgment rule); Crown Zellerbach
v. Sir James Goldsmith, 609 F. Supp. 187, 188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (refusing to enjoin Crown
Zellerbach's distribution of common stock purchase rights); Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus.,
Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1135-36 (D. Nev. 1984) (denying motion to preliminarily enjoin South-
west from issuing stock purchase rights). In addition to challenging the adoption of poison pill
stock purchase rights plans, shareholders also have contested the issuance of poison pill preferred
stock. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Lenox, Inc., No. 82-2116 (D.N.J. June 10, 1983)
(available on LEXIS, States library, Del file) (denying Brown-Forman's request to preliminarily
enjoin Lenox from issuing preferred stock dividend); National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co.,
No. 7278 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1983) (available on LEXIS, States library, Del file) (disallowing
National Education Corporation's motion to preliminarily enjoin Bell & Howell from issuing
poison pill preferred stock).
39. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
40. See supra note 33 (discussing business judgment rule).
41. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (according benefit
of business judgment rule to Household board's adoption of rights plan).
42. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1064 (Del. Ch. 1985). In Moran,
Household's management was aware as early as February 1984 of the company's susceptibility
to a takeover. Id. Personnel of Dysner-Kissner-Moran Corporation (DKM), the largest stock-
1986]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
impending threat of a takeover, Household's management considered various
amendments to Household's bylaws that would discourage any potential
takeover.4 3 Meanwhile John A. Moran, a member of Household's board,
initiated discussions with the chairman of Household's board, Donald C.
Clark, about the possibility of a leveraged buyout 4 of Household by Dyson-
Kissner-Moran Corporation (DKM). 4s Moran was Chairman of DKM, which
was the largest single stockholder of Household." Although Moran's pro-
posal never amounted to anything more than discussion, Household soon
sought legal and financial expertise in developing a takeover defense strat-
egy. 47 On August 14, 1984, Household's board met to consider a defense
scheme that included a poison pill stock purchase rights dividend plan.
4
After discussing the proposed rights plan with counsel and investment
bankers, the Household board approved the rights plan (Rights Plan).
4 9
Under the Rights Plan, each stockholder of Household received a
dividend of one purchase right for each share of Household common stock
outstanding. 0 Each right, which had a term of ten years,"1 allowed a holder
to purchase one one-hundredth of a share of a new series of subordinated
holder of Household, conducted a financial study of Household which revealed that the market
significantly had undervalued Household's stock in relation to Household's breakup value. Id.
DKM subsequently increased its equity position in Household by purchasing 500,000 shares of
Household common stock in the open market. Id.
43. See id. at 1064 (Household analyzed various charter amendments to thwart possible
takeover). Although Moran is unclear regarding the specific amendments that the Household board
examined, typical defensive charter provisions include supermajority voting provisions, fair price
provisions, and mandatory redemption provisions. See Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeo-
vers: Charter and By-Law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537, 548-56 (1979) (discussing defensive
charter and bylaw provisions).
44. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 3, at § 9.0315] (discussing leveraged
buyouts). A leveraged buyout occurs when an acquiror uses the assets of the target company
as financing for the acquiror's purchase. See id. (creditors of acquiror look to assets acquired
and future earning power of target company for satisfaction of acquiror's debt).
45. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1064 (Del. Ch. 1985).
46. Id. at 1063.
47. Id. at 1065.
48. Id. In Moran, the architect of Household's poison pill stock purchase rights dividend
plan (Rights Plan), Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, met with the Household
board to formulate a comprehensive takeover strategy. Id. In addition to the Rights Plan, the
antitakeover scheme included a general policy statement regarding the long term interests of the
corporation, certain bylaw amendments regarding special shareholder meetings and written con-
sents, and changes in Household's employee stock benefits plans (ESOP) that would allow the
beneficial owners to tender ESOP stock in the event of a tender offer. Id. Before the Household
directors met to consider a defensive stock purchase rights plan, Household sent a summary of
the proposed Rights Plan to each member of Household's board. Id.
49. Id. In Moran, Household's board consisted of ten outside directors and six inside di-
rectors or members of management. Id. at 1064. Aside from Moran, John C. Whitehead was the
only Household director to vote against the Rights Plan. Id. at 1066. Whitehead, a director of
Goldman, Sachs & Co., expressed concern that adopting the Rights Plan would draw unwanted
attention to Household. Id. at 1067.
50. Rights Plan, supra note 4, at 422.59.
5 1. See id. at 422.63 (rights expire August 31, 1994 if board does not redeem rights sooner).
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participating Household preferred stock for an exercise price of one hundred
dollars. 2 Each share of new Household preferred stock carried a dividend
right equal to one hundred times the dividend on Household's common
stock53 and entitled a holder to one hundred votes on any matter presented
to Household stockholders . 4 The Rights Plan affixed one purchase right to
each share of Household common stock.5 Prior to the occurrence of a
triggering event,5 6 a rightsholder could not trade the warrants separably from
Household common stock.5 7 The Rights Plan provided for the exercise of
the rights upon one of two events: (1) a person or group announces a tender
or exchange offer for thirty percent or more of Household's common stock,
or (2) a person acquires twenty percent of Household's common stock,
acquires the right to purchase twenty percent of Household's common stock,
or announces the formation of a group representing twenty percent of
Household's common stock to act together.5 The crux of the Rights Plan,
however, was that in the event of a merger or other combination of
Household with an outside acquiror, each purchase right flipped over and
entitled a rightsholder to purchase stock of any acquiring company at one-
half the market value of the acquiror's stock.5 9 Under the Rights Plan, the
52. Id. at 422.60, 422.63. To cover the rights dividend, the Household board in Moran
adopted a resolution creating 700,000 shares of preferred stock. See Form of Designation, Pref-
erences and Rights of Series A Junior Participating Preferred Stock of Household International,
Inc. (creating new series of preferred stock) [hereinafter cited as Preferences and Rights], re-
printed in SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 4, at 442.82-88 . The Rights Plan obligated Household
to keep available a sufficient amount of preferred stock for issuance in the event that Household
stockholders exercised the rights. Rights Plan, supra note 4, at 422.64-65. The Rights Plan in
Moran also provided that Household may adjust the exercise price of the warrants from time
to time in case of certain stock splits or reclassifications. Id. at 422.63.
53. See Preferences and Rights, supra note 52, at 422.83 (entitling preferred stockholders
to quarterly dividend).
54. See id. at 422.84 (one one-hundredth of a share of series A preferred entitled holder to
one vote).
55. Rights Plan, supra note 4, at 422.59.
56. See infra text accompanying note 58 (discussing triggering events).
57. See Rights Plan, supra note 4, at 422.61 (before triggering event activates rights, rights-
holders may not transfer rights separately from Household common). Until an event triggered
the rights, the stockholders' certificates of common stock evidenced the existence of the rights in
Moran. Id. One share of Household common stock represented one stock purchase right. Id.
Upon activation, the warrants "detached" from the common stock, and separate rights certifi-
cates represented the Household warrants. Id. See also Right Certificate, Household Interna-
tional, Inc. (form of right certificate), reprinted in SHRK REPELLENTS, supra note 4, at 422.89.
The Rights Plan obligated Household's rights agent, Harris Trust and Savings Bank, to issue the
rights certificates to Household stockholders, and enforce the rights in the event that rightshold-
ers exercised the warrants to purchase new preferred stock. See Rights Plan, supra note 4, at
422.61, 422.63-64 (instructing rights agent to issue right certificates and requisition preferred stock).
58. Rights Plan, supra note 4, at 422.61. See also Moran, 490 A.2d at 1066 (discussing
triggering events of Rights Plan).
59. See Nat'l L.J., March 25, 1985, at 15, col. I (primary significance of Rights Plan sur-
faces upon consummation of merger); Rights Plan, supra note 4, at 422.72 (flip-over feature of
warrants). The Rights Plan in Moran allowed rightsholders to purchase an amount of an ac-
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Household board could redeem the rights for fifty cents per right at any
time prior to a twenty percent acquisition of Household's common stock.6
Subsequent to the adoption of the Rights Plan, Moran and DKM filed
suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery, alleging that the Rights Plan
unjustifiably impinged upon the fundamental rights of Household sharehold-
ers to market Household shares and that the Rights Plan restricted the right
of Household shareholders to conduct a proxy contest . 6 The Delaware Court
of Chancery upheld the adoption of the Household Rights Plan as an
appropriate managerial decision under the business judgment rule.6 2 Moran
and DKM then appealed the chancery court's decision to the Delaware
Supreme Court, again challenging the Rights Plan's purported usurpation of
shareholder rights, and disputing the power of the Household board to adopt
the Rights Plan.6
In addressing the validity of the Household board's adoption of the
Rights Plan, the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran placed fundamental
significance upon the applicability of the business judgment rule to the
board's decision.6 Citing its recent decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme Court noted that the business judg-
ment rule was an appropriate standard to evaluate a board of directors'
decision regarding pending takeover bids.," The Moran court added, more-
quiring company's stock having a market value of twice the exercise price of the warrants. Rights
Plan, supra note 4, at 422.72. By merging or consolidating with Household, any acquiring com-
pany assumed the duties and obligations of Household under the Rights Plan, including the ob-
ligation to provide for the purchase of the acquiror's common stock for one-half of the stock's
market value. See id. (acquiror liable for duties and obligations of Household under Rights Plan).
The Rights Plan precluded Household from consummating any merger or consolidation without
first executing an agreement with an acquiror binding the acquiror to the Rights Plan. Id. at
422.73.
60. Rights Plan, supra note 4, at 422.79. See also supra note 10 and accompanying text
(discussing redemption feature of poison pill rights plan).
61. Moran, 490 A.2d at 1064.
62. Id. at 1083. The business judgment rule accords a board of directors a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the directors acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief
that the action taken served the best interests of the company. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984). See also supra note 33 (discussing business judgment rule).
63. Moran, 500 A.2d 1346, 1351 (Del. 1985).
64. See id. at 1350 (court's central concern is applicability of business judgment rule to
Household board's decision). In Moran, neither Moran nor DKM alleged that the Household
board adopted the Rights Plan for entrenchment purposes. Consequently, the Delaware Supreme
Court did not engage in a duty of loyalty and primary purpose analysis. See id. at 1356 (no
allegations of conflict of duty of loyalty breach); supra note 33 (discussing judicial application
of primary purpose test).
65. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware Su-
preme Court addressed the validity of an exchange offer by Unocal of Unocal's outstanding stock
for debt securities as a defense against Mesa's hostile takeover bid. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Pe-
troleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 951 (1985). Unocal's exchange offer excluded Mesa, which held ap-
proximately 13% of Unocal's stock, from participating in Unocal's exchange of debt securities
for outstanding Unocal common stock. Id. In determining the applicability of the business judg-
ment rule to the Unocal board's discriminatory exchange offer, the Unocal court determined that
a board should enjoy the same discretion regarding a pending takeover bid that a board enjoys
with other business decisions. Id. at 954.
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over, that applying the business judgment rule to a board's preplanned,
prospective takeover defense is even more appropriate than applying the rule
to a board's decision to adopt a defensive mechanism in the heat of a
takeover battle. 6 The court reasoned that prospective planning for the
possibility of a hostile takeover bid may reduce the likelihood that a board,
acting under the pressure of an imminent takeover attempt, will fail to
exercise prudent judgment. 67
The Moran court recognized that applying the business judgment rule
necessitated an initial inquiry into the Household board's authority to adopt
the Rights Plan.6 While Moran and DKM contended that Delaware corporate
law did not authorize the adoption of the plan,69 the Moran court disagreed
and found sufficient statutory authority for adopting the Rights Plan.70 The
court held that section 157 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL),7' which allows a corporation to issue purchase rights, and section
151(g) of the DGCL, 72 which provides for issuing new stock, authorized the
Rights Plan." The Moran court also found that section 141(a)74 of the
DGCL, which confers certain inherent powers upon a board of directors,
supplemented the Household Board's authority to enact the Rights Plan.
75
In addressing Moran and DKM's contention that the Rights Plan constituted
66. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350. See Moran, 490 A.2d at 1064-65 (Household's management
was unaware of any specific impending takeover threats when Moran filed suit).
67. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 1351 (appellants asserted that adoption of Rights Plan fell outside parameters
of Delaware law).
70. Id. at 1353, 1357. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing Household's
statutory authority for Rights Plan).
71. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1983). Section 157 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law (DGCL) states in pertinent part:
Subject to any provisions in the certificate of incorporation, every corporation
may create and issue, whether or not in connection with the issue and sale of any shares
of stock or other securities of the corporation, rights or options entitling the holders
thereof to purchase from the corporation any shares of its capital stock of any class
or classes, such rights or options to be evidenced by or in such instrument or instru-
ments as shall be approved by the board of directors.
Id.
72. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(g) (1983). Section 151(g) of the DGCL provides in part:
When any corporation desires to issue any shares of stock.. .of which the voting
powers, designations, preferences and.. .other rights.. .shall not have been set forth
in the certificate of incorporation. . .but shall be provided for in a resolu-
tion... adopted by the board of directors pursuant to authority expressly vested in it
by... the certificate of incorporation..., a certificate setting forth a copy of such
resolution.. .shall become effective ....
Id.
73. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1363.
74. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1984). Section 141(a) of the DGCL gives a board of
directors authority to manage the business and affairs of a corporation. Id. The Moran court
maintained that § 141(a) conferred inherent powers upon the Household board that supplemented
the board's authority to enact the Rights Plan. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353.
75. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353.
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an unauthorized usurpation of Household shareholders' right to consider
tender offers, the Moran court downplayed the deterrent effect of the Rights
Plan and cited several means by which shareholders or an outside offeror
could circumvent the Rights Plan and allow a tender offer to succeed.7 6 The
Moran court found that a person or group could condition a tender offer
for Household's common stock on the Household board's redemption of
the purchase rights or the acquisition of a high percentage of the rights.
77
The court also maintained that a potential acquiror could solicit consents
from Household shareholders to remove the Household board and redeem
the rights, or acquire fifty percent of Household's shares and force manage-
ment to self-tender for the rights. 78 While maintaining that the Rights Plan
did not wrongfully restrict shareholders' ability to consider hostile tender
offers, the Moran court emphasized that in the event of a tender offer or a
request to redeem the purchase warrants, the Household board still must
satisfy the board's fiduciary duties in determining whether to accept or reject
the offer or request.
7 9
In addition to alleging that the Household board wrongfully impinged
the shareholders' ability to consider hostile tender offers, Moran and DKM
claimed that the Household board's adoption of the Rights Plan would
effectuate an additional, unauthorized transfer of power from stockholders
to directors. 0 Moran and DKM asserted that by deterring tender offers, the
76. Id. at 1354.
77. Id.
78. Id. As an example of a hostile takeover bid succeeding against a poison pill defense,
the Moran court noted Sir James Goldsmith's takeover of Crown Zellerbach Corporation
(Crown Zellerbach). See id. (Goldsmith's acquisition of Crown Zellerbach represents circum-
vention of poison pill rights plan); Wall St. J., July 26, 1985, at 3, col. I (describing takeover
of Crown Zellerbach). In response to Sir James Goldsmith's hostile takeover threat, Crown
Zellerbach adopted a poison pill stock purchase rights plan similar to the Household Rights
Plan. See SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 4, at 396-97 (discussing Crown Zellerbach's poison
pill); Crown Zellerbach Rights Agreement, supra note 4, at 417 (text of Crown Zellerbach's
stock purchase rights plan). The Crown Zellerbach Agreement activated upon the occurrence of
events similar to the Household Rights Plan and, like the Household plan, allowed Crown
Zellerbach rightsholders to purchase shares of an acquiror's common stock at a 50% discount
in the event of a merger. See Crown Zellerbach Rights Agreement, supra note 4, at 422
(triggering events for Crown Zellerbach rights are 20% acquisition of Crown Zellerbach common
stock or announcement of intent to purchase 30% of outstanding stock); see also id. at 422.8-
22.9 (entitling rightsholders to purchase stock of any acquiror at one-half stock's market value).
Crown Zellerbach's rights plan, however, did not prevent Goldsmith eventually from acquiring
Crown Zellerbach. Wall St. J., July 26, 1985, at 3, col. I. Goldsmith overcame Crown
Zellerbach's antitakeover defense by steadily increasing his interest in Crown Zellerbach to 52%
of Crown Zellerbach's common stock. Id. Although Crown Zellerbach issued the rights after
Goldsmith had purchased 20% of Crown Zellerbach's common stock, Goldsmith eluded the
poison pill by acquiring majority control of Crown Zellerbach through open market purchases
without consummating a complete merger. Id. at 12. See infra notes 120-22 (discussing purchase
of controlling interest as means for circumventing purchase rights plan).
79. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354, 1357; see Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 954-55, 958 (Del. 1985) (board has duty to ascertain whether offer serves best interests of
company and stockholders).
80. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
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Rights Plan granted an improper plenary negotiating role to the Household
board in all tender offers.8 ' Moran and DKM argued that Household could
not restructure the proper allocation of authority between board and share-
holders without the consent of the owners of Household stock.8 2 To refute
the argument that the deterrent effect of the Rights Plan cast the Household
board in the role of primary tender offer negotiator, the Moran court
restated that the Rights Plan did not render Household impregnable against
hostile tender offers.83 The court again noted that the Household board did
not enjoy unfettered discretion in enacting a defensive measure or refusing
to redeem the purchase rights8
Moran and DKM lastly contended that the Household board acted
beyond its corporate authority in adopting a mechanism that wrongly re-
stricted shareholders' rights to conduct a proxy solicitation. 5 Moran and
DKM asserted that the Rights Plan prevented a stockholder or group of
stockholders from accumulating enough stock to conduct an effective proxy
contest.8 6 According to Moran and DKM, since acquiring twenty percent of
Household stock or forming a group representing twenty percent of House-
hold's common stock to act together triggered the warrants and rendered the
rights nonredeemable, 7 the Rights Plan placed an economic penalty on a
person or group with twenty percent voting control and thus effectively
prevented any person or group from acquiring twenty percent of Household
shares before conducting a proxy contest.8 8 The Moran court found that the
81. See Opening Brief of Appellants at 63, Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985) (Household board lacked power to grant itself plenary negotiating power)
[hereinafter cited as Appellants' Brief]; Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076
(Del. Ch. 1985) (Rights Plan allowed board to act as prime negotiator of tender offers).
82. Appellants' Brief, supra note 81, at 63.
83. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354-55. The Delaware Supreme Court in Moran refused to
accept Moran and DKM's argument that the Rights Plan significantly altered the fundamental
relationship between Household shareholders and the board of directors. See id. at 1354
(adopting Rights Plan does little to change governance structure). The Delaware Chancery
Court, however, found that the deterrent effect of the Rights Plan resulted in a reallocation of
authority that affected the structural relationship between the board and stockholders. Moran,
490 A.2d at 1076. The Delaware Court of Chancery in Moran maintained that the reallocation
of authority in the shareholder-board relationship, rather than any inherent director conflict of
interest in a takeover situation, required the board to adhere to an enhanced duty of proof to
demonstrate the reasonableness of the board's transaction. Id.; see infra notes 95-98 and
accompanying text (discussing board's threshold duty of proof in takeover situations). The
Delaware Supreme Court, on the other hand, agreed that the board must pass a threshold
inquiry of reasonableness when taking defensive action, but based the court's conclusion on the
inherent conflict of interest that exists when a board of directors considers a takeover bid. See
Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356 (citing Unocal for proposition that directors must satisfy initial burden
of persuasion); infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing board's threshold duty of
proof in takeover context).
84. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
85. Id. at 1355.
86. Id.
87. See supra text accompanying note 58 (discussing triggering events of Rights Plan).
88. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355.
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restriction upon persons or groups from acquiring a twenty percent interest
in Household before commencing a proxy contest did not restrict fundamen-
tally the shareholders' right to conduct a proxy contest.8 9 While conceding
that the Rights Plan could deter proxy efforts representing twenty percent
or more of Household's shares, the Moran court concluded that the effects
of the Rights Plan upon proxy contests would be minimal.9 The court noted
that insurgent shareholders with stock ownership of less than twenty percent
often win proxy contests and that owning large interests in a company does
not guarantee the success of a proxy contest. 9'
After affirming the authority of the Household board to adopt the
Rights Plan, the Moran court addressed the issue of whether the Household
directors, in adopting the Rights Plan, had met the board's burden92 under
the business judgment rule. 93 Following its decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co.,94 the Delaware Supreme Court maintained that, although the
plaintiff normally bears the threshold burden of rebutting the presumptions
accorded under the business judgment rule, when a board of directors adopts
an antitakeover mechanism, the board initially carries the burden of showing
reasonable grounds for believing that a threat to the company's continued
effectiveness existed. 95 The court also found that a board which has adopted
a challenged takeover defense must demonstrate the reasonableness of the
defense in relation to the danger posed.9 According to the Moran court, the
existence of a majority of independent, outside directors on the company's
board significantly strengthens a director's argument that the board acted
89. Moran, 490 A.2d 1059, 1080 (Del. Ch. 1985).
90. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355. See Moran, 490 A.2d at 1080 (although Rights Plan
discouraged large accumulations of stock for proxy efforts, Plan did not restrict voting power
of individual shares).
91. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355.
92. See infra notes 93-98, 105-06 and accompanying text (discussing burden of Household
board under Moran court's interpretation of business judgment rule).
93. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355.
94. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
95. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
954-55, 958 (Del. 1985) (imposing enhanced duty on board of directors in takeover situations).
The Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. found that a board of
directors must show reasonable grounds for perceiving the existence of a danger to corporate
policy when the board has adopted a defensive mechanism. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The
Unocal court determined, however, that directors can satisfy the burden of reasonableness by
demonstrating good faith and a reasonable investigation. Id. As determined earlier by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Cheff v. Mathes, the court will not penalize a director for an
honest mistake of judgment if the judgment appeared reasonable when the director made the
decision. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964); see also supra note 33 (discussing
allocating burden of proof under business judgment rule).
96. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (defensive measure must be
reasonable in relation to threat posed to receive protection under business judgment rule). In
determining whether a defensive measure is reasonably related to the threat posed to corporate
policy, directors must analyze the nature of the takeover bid and the bid's effect on the corpora-
tion. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
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reasonably. 97 The Moran court maintained that once a board of directors
has shown reasonable grounds for believing that a threat to the corporation
exists, and has shown that the defensive mechanism was reasonable in light
of the threat, the burden of persuasion shifts to the plaintiff, who then must
demonstrate that the board breached its fiduciary duties to the corporation
and shareholders in adopting the antitakeover defense."
While holding the Household board to a heightened burden of demon-
strating the reasonableness of the Rights Plan, the Moran court found that
Household's directors had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to
the company's continued effectiveness existed, and that the Rights Plan was
a reasonable response to the threat. 99 The court explained that in adopting
the Rights Plan, the Household board reacted to what the board rationally
perceived as Household's vulnerability to coercive acquisition strategies.1°
The court noted that the Household board was concerned about Moran's
expressed interest regarding the possible buyout of Household, and the
increasing prevalence of "bootstrap" and "bust-up" takeovers, as well as
coercive two-tier tender offers.'0'
97. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
98. Id. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55, 958 (discussing director's enhanced duty when
adopting defensive mechanism against takeover bid). In requiring a board of directors initially
to demonstrate a defensive measure's reasonableness before according the board's decision the
protection of the business judgment rule, the Unocal court departed from the traditional
allocation of proof under the business judgment rul. See Legal Times, Jan. 20, 1986, at 510,
col. 2 (discussing "reformulated" business judgment rule under Unocal). A majority of courts
hold that the plaintiff bears the initial burden of rebutting the presumption of the business
judgment rule. See supra note 33 (discussing allocation of proof under business judgment rule).
The Unocal court, however, recognized that when dealing with directors' decisions on proposed
takeover bids, courts should apply the business judgment rule differently than in regular business
transactions. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55 (discussing caveats to business judgment rule).
The reason for applying the business judgment rule differently in a control context is that in
addressing a proposed takeover bid, a board of directors faces an inherent conflict of interest.
Id. at 954; see Bennet v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962) (takeover proposal necessarily
confronts management with conflict of interest); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 31, at 1175
(target's management has significant stake in maintaining company's independence); Gilson,
supra note 31, at 825 (directors subject to conflict of interest when faced with proposal for
company's acquisition). Objectively evaluating a hostile takeover bid is difficult for management
since a successful hostile tender offer quite possibly will eradicate existing management's
position. See Bennet v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962) (discussing problem of objectivity
that confronts management in addressing takeover bid). As a result, directors bear a burden of
demonstrating the reasonableness of an antitakeover defense before a court can accord the
board's decision the protections under the business judgment rule. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. If
a board satisfies the standard of reasonableness, a court may accord the protection of the
business judgment rule to the directors. Id. at 958. The plaintiff then must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the directors breached their fiduciary duty. Id. A plaintiff
must show a breach of fiduciary duty by demonstrating that the directors, in adopting a
takeover defense, primarily intended to entrench themselves in office, or that the directors acted
fraudulently, in bad faith, or on an uninformed basis. Id.
99. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357.
100. Id. at 1356.
101. Id. A "bootstrap" or "bust-up" bid is an offer for a target that an offeror finances
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Moran and DKM did not allege bad faith on the part of Household's
board, or that Household adopted the Rights Plan for the primary purpose
of entrenching the board in office.' 0 2 Instead, Moran and DKM asserted that
the Household board breached its fiduciary duty of care by failing to make
an informed business decision in adopting the Rights Plan. 03 Under the
standard enunciated by the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van
Gorkam,'4 however, the Moran court found that Household's board had
evaluated sufficiently the Rights Plan before voting on the measure, and thus
had made an informed business decision concerning the adoption of the
Rights Plan. 03 As evidence that the Household board undertook a knowl-
edgeable decision-making process, the Moran court noted that the Household
directors had received a three-page summary of the Rights Plan prior to the
board's meeting to consider a defense strategy.' 6 The court also added that
the directors extensively discussed and evaluated the plan with legal counsel
and financial experts. 0 7 Observing that the Household board had acted on
an informed basis,'0 8 pursuant to statutory authority,' °9 and under the well-
founded belief that the Rights Plan responded reasonably to a significant
with the assets of the target company. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 3, at § 1.04[8]
(discussing bootstrap bids). After the takeover, the acquiror "busts up" or sells assets of the
target to retire part of the purchaser's acquisition financing debt. Id.
102. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356 (no allegations of bad faith or entrenchment against
Household directors).
103. Id. Moran and DKM contended that the Household board in Moran negligently
adopted the Rights Plan. Id. Moran and DKM based the assertion of an uninformed board
decision upon the following: (a) the failure of Household's counsel to express an opinion on
the flip-over feature of the purchase rights, (b) the lack of a statement by Household's counsel
that the Rights Plan would prohibit any hostile takeover of Household, and (c) the opinion of
Household's counsel that the Rights Plan would not prohibit a proxy contest and that the
Rights Plan fell within the parameters of the business judgment rule. Id.
104. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the
Delaware Supreme Court found that courts should apply a standard of gross negligence to
directors' decisions in determining whether a board of directors exercised informed business
judgment. Id. See Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom after Van
Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 8-14 (1985) (discussing practical implications of Van Gorkom
decision). According to Van Gorkom, directors personally should review pertinent information
concerning a tender offer in addressing a proposed takeover bid. See id. (discussing directors'
standard of compliance under Van Gorkom). The directors' duty to inform themselves most
likely extends to acquiring outside advice concerning a fair price for the target's shares and the
consequences of pursuing alternative courses of action in connection with the takeover bid. Id.
105. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356 (Household directors were not grossly negligent in
analyzing Rights Plan prior to adoption).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. (Household management made informed decision regarding Rights Plan); supra
notes 105-07 and accompanying text (discussing Household board's compliance with duty to
exercise informed business judgment).
109. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1351-53, 1357 (§§ 157, 151 and 141 of DGL authorized
Rights Plan); supra notes 71-75 (discussing Moran court's application of Delaware corporate
law to Rights Plan).
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threat to corporate policy," 0 the Moran court concluded that the business
judgment rule protected the Household board's adoption of the Rights
Plan."' Importantly, however, the Moran court limited the court's decision
concerning the Rights Plan to the board's present prospective adoption of
the Rights Plan." 2 The court stressed that the board's actual response to a
specific hostile takeover bid and a request to redeem the rights must conform
to the director's fiduciary duties to the corporation and shareholders when
and if the board actually faced a hostile tender offer and a request to redeem
the rights. "'
The Moran court's endorsement of the Household Rights Plan is signif-
icant. "4 Moran represents the first endorsement of poison pill warrants by a
state supreme court and appears to validate the adoption of a prospective
purchase rights plan under Delaware law.' 15 Moran, therefore, may influence
other courts that must consider the validity of purchase rights plans under
the laws of states other than Delaware. ' 6 In addition, many large, publicly
held corporations recently have added purchase rights plans similar to the
Household Rights Plan to corporate takeover defense arsenals.' 7 Boards of
directors, however, should recognize the limitations of Moran and purchase
rights plans." 8 Poison pills such as the Household Rights Plan will not
immunize corporations from the threat of hostile takeover bids.1 9 To illus-
trate, since the flip-over feature of poison pill warrants normally activates
only in the event of a merger, 20 a purchase rights plan would not deter an
110. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356-57 (Household board demonstrated that directors had
reasonable grounds for believing existence of danger to corporate policy and that Rights Plan
was reasonable in relation to threat posed); supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing
Household board's compliance with burden of reasonableness under business judgment rule).
111. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357 (according Household directors benefit of business
judgment rule).
112. Id.
113. Id. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (board
has obligation to determine whether offer is in best interests of corporation and shareholders);
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (directors have duty to exercise
informed business judgment).
114. See Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1986, at 6, col. 2 (discussing proliferation of use of poison
pills since Moran).
115. See Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 22, col. 4 (Moran has helped establish fundamental
legality of rights plan under Delaware law).
116. See id. at 27, col. 3 (Moran court's affirmation of Rights Plan under business
judgment rule should be instrumental in non-Delaware forums).
117. Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1985, at 6, col. 2. See supra note 4 (listing companies that have
adopted poison pill plans).
118. See infra notes 119-60 and accompanying text (discussing Moran's potential restraints
on purchase rights plan).
119. See Nat'l L.J., Mar. 25, 1985, at 18, col. I (discussing deficiencies of poison pill war-
rants); Moran, 490 A.2d at 1066 (author of Household Rights Plan conceded that plan does
not render company takeover proof); supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing means
of circumventing purchase rights plans); infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text (same).
120. See supra notes 21, 59 and accompanying text (discussing flip-over feature of House-
hold Rights Plan).
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acquiror that is willing to purchase a controlling interest without completing
a second step merger.'2 ' The acquiror presumably could purchase the con-
trolling interest either in the open market or through a partial tender offer.12
An acquiror also could condition a cash tender offer for all of the target's
stock and rights upon the acquisition of a high minimum percentage of stock
and rights. 23 An offer conditioned on a high minimum percentage of stock
and rights would reduce the dilutive effect of the rights in the second step
merger.' 2 Other means to circumvent a purchase rights plan include com-
mencing a proxy fight and soliciting shareholder consents to gain control of
the target.2 Once in control, the acquiror can force the board to redeem or
self-tender for the rights.
26
Corporate directors also should realize that the Moran court's validation
of the Household Rights Plan is not a sweeping affirmation of every
conceivable variant of the plan. 27 Several courts have invalidated similar
mechanisms in different contexts. 28 For example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc.
refused to accord the business judgment rule to a defensive stock issuance
plan by Norlin Corp. (Norlin).' 29 In Norlin, the Norlin board of directors
issued new common and voting preferred stock to a wholly owned Pana-
manian subsidiary and a newly created employee stock option plan (ESOP)
in response to the acquisition of large blocks of Norlin stock by Rooney,
Pace, Inc. (Rooney). 30 The Norlin board retained voting control over the
newly issued stock, giving the board control of forty-nine percent of Norlin's
121. See Katcher & Chapnick, supra note 2, at 415 (purchase rights plan will not avert
acquisition of controlling interest in target); supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing
means of defeating rights plans).
122. Id. But see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing protection against
partial and two-tier tender offers).
123. See Katcher & Chapnick, supra note 2, at 425 (discussing potential raider responses
to poison pill warrants).
124. Id. See supra note 24 (discussing inverse relation between dilutive effect of purchase
rights plan on acquiror's equity and amount of stock for which acquiror tenders).
125. Katcher & Chapnick, supra note 2, at 425.
126. Id.
127. See infra notes 128-41 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have disallowed
variations of poison pill warrants).
128. See Chittur, supra note 2, at 44 (endorsing Household Rights Plan does not guarantee
validity of other similar poison pill plans). Several cases arguably have cast doubt upon the
validity of defensive mechanisms in certain circumstances. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace,
Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264-66 (2d Cir. 1984) (board of directors breached fiduciary duty of care
by issuing shares of stock to subsidiary and ESOP in manner that effectively assured manage-
ment of voting control over company); Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., Inc., 501 A.2d 401,
408 (Del. 1985) (invalidating board's attempt to dilute successful acquisition through issuance
of treasury shares to ESOP); infra notes 129-41 and accompanying text (discussing Norlin and
Frantz).
129. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 1984) (denying
business judgment rule to Norlin board).
130. Id. at 259.
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outstanding stock.' Imposing an injunction prohibiting Norlin's issuance of
the new stock, the Norlin court ruled that the duty of loyalty superseded the
duty of care when a plaintiff can demonstrate self-dealing or bad faith on
the part of the directors.' 32 The court surmised that the Norlin board issued
the stock primarily to solidify management's control of the company.'33
Furthermore, the Norlin court found that the board failed to show that
issuing the Panamanian and ESOP stock was fair and reasonable to Norlin
stockholders and thus concluded that the board breached its fiduciary duty
of loyalty.
134
Another example of a court disallowing a defensive stock issuance is
Frantz Manufacturing Co. v. EA C Industries, Inc. 13S In Frantz, the Delaware
Court of Chancery issued a preliminary injunction to enjoin Frantz Manu-
facturing Co. (Frantz) from issuing treasury shares to an ESOP. 136 The
Frantz board of directors issued the treasury shares to dilute the stock
ownership of EAC Industries, Inc., which recently had acquired a fifty-one
percent interest in Frantz. 137 The Frantz court held that the business judgment
rule did not protect the Frantz board's retrospective defensive stock issu-
ance.' One can distinguish, however, the antitakeover mechanisms in Norlin
and Frantz from the Household Rights Plan in Moran.39 In Norlin and
Frantz the stock issuances involved redistributions of voting power to thwart
takeovers, whereas the Household Rights Plan relied on an economic deter-
rent which the Household board designed to discourage acquisition of the com-
pany. 4 0 Norlin and Frantz, nonetheless, at least suggest a judicial unwillingness
to grant corporate boards unbridled discretion in formulating defensive
strategies against hostile acquirors."
131. Id.
132. Id. at 265. See supra note 33 (discussing director's fiduciary duty of loyalty).
133. Norlin, 744 F.2d at 265.
134. Id. at 266.
135. Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., Inc., 501 A.2d 401, 408 (Del. 1985).
136. See id. at 408 (board's primary purpose of issuing treasury shares was to perpetuate
control of company).
137. See id. at 402 (Frantz board attempted to dilute EAC's control of Frantz voting stock
by issuing shares to ESOP).
138. See id. at 408 (business judgment rule will not protect target board's attempt to undo
takeover bid after acquiror gains against control of target).
139. See infra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between defensive
measures in Norlin, Frantz, and Moran).
140. See Norlin, 744 F.2d at 259 (Norlin board's defensive stock issuance granted board
control of 49% of Norlin stock); Frantz, 501 A.2d at 402 (Frantz board's defensive stock
issuance attempted to dilute EAC's newly acquired control of 51% of Frantz stock). In addition
to redistributing the voting power of Frantz Manufacturing Co., the defensive stock issuance
in Frantz was a retrospective attempt to defeat an already successful takeover bid by EAC
Industries, Inc., as compared to the prospective nature of the Household Rights Plan in Moran.
See Frantz, 501 A.2d at 408 (declining to accord protection of business judgment rule to
retrospective takeover defense). In Norlin, the Norlin board issued its stock in the heat of a
takeover battle with Rooney, Pace, Inc. Norlin, 744 F.2d at 265.
141. See Norlin, 744 F.2d at 266 (disallowing defensive stock issuance plan); Frantz, 501
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Although the Moran court accorded the protection of the business
judgment rule to the Household board's decision to adopt the Rights Plan,
the court required Household's directors to satisfy an initial burden of
persuasion before deferring to the board's decision. 42 When considering the
applicability of the business judgment rule to the adoption of a takeover
defense, therefore, a court first may inquire whether a board had reasonable
grounds to believe that a danger to the corporation existed and whether the
defensive policy that the board exercised was reasonable in light of the threat
posed.' 43 A board of directors possesses a heightened duty in adopting
antitakeover techniques because of the inherent conflict of interest that exists
when a board takes action in response to the threat of a hostile takeover.'4
In reacting to a hostile takeover bid, a board effectively may decide whether
existing management will remain intact. 45 The possibility that directors will
act to sustain management positions is significant, and requires an initial
judicial examination of the board's action in response to a hostile tender
offer. 46 The practical effect of the judicial inquiry is to require the board of
directors initially to demonstrate that the decision to approve the defensive
mechanism was reasonable. 47 Once the directors have established that a
reasonable basis existed for adopting the takeover defense 48 and that the
A.2d at 408 (refusing to endorse board's retrospective takeover defense); see also Ministar
Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1257-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (invalidating AMF's
poison pill warrants that effectively placed veto power over mergers in select group of
stockholders); Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407, 409-10
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (issuing preliminary injunction against Richardson-Vicks' issuance of poison
pill preferred stock that entitled current stockholders to 25 votes per share but limited transferees
to five votes per share); ASARCO, Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 479-80 (D.N.J. 1985)
(enjoining Court's defensive issuance of preferred stock that entitled owners of less than 20%
of company's stock to extraordinary voting rights but excluded shareholders who owned 20%
or more of corporation's stock).
142. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (discussing
threshold duty imposed on directors by Moran); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d at 954-55 (board carries enhanced duty before receiving protection of business judgment
rule when board addresses pending takeover bid); see also supra note 33 (discussing normal
allocation of burden of proof under business judgment rule).
143. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55. See supra notes 92-98 and
accompanying text (discussing board's heightened duty when addressing takeover offer).
144. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (board faces intrinsic conflict of interest in addressing
takeover offer); supra note 98 (discussing directors' inherent conflict of interest in addressing
takeover bid).
145. See supra note 98 (acquiescing to takeover bid often terminates existing management's
position).
146. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (possibility exists that biased judgment will affect board
decisions on takeover bids); supra note 98 (discussing conflict of interest problems in defending
against takeovers).
147. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356 (requiring board to show reasonableness of Rights
Plan); supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (discussing directors' burden of persuasion in
takeover context).
148. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (director can demonstrate rational belief in existing
corporate danger by showing good faith and reasonable investigation); supra note 95 and
accompanying text (discussing directors' burden of demonstrating reasonableness).
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mechanism was reasonable in relation to the existing danger, 49 the burden
shifts to the plaintiff, who then must show a breach of the director's fiduciary
obligations such as bad faith or abuse of discretion.' 50 Ordinarily, if the
board can articulate a rational business purpose for adopting the takeover
defense, a court will refuse to second-guess the board's decision. 5' Signifi-
cantly, the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran extended the application of
the board's duty from the adoption of a defensive mechanism in the face of
a pending takeover threat, as in Unocal, '52 to the prospective adoption of a
takeover defense, such as the Rights Plan in Moran. 5 Thus, even though
applying the business judgment rule may be particularly appropriate to the
adoption of a preplanned defensive mechanism,' 54 a board that approves a
prospective defensive measure must be able to articulate reasonable grounds
upon which the directors acted before the board can receive the protection
of the business judgment rule.' 5
In addition to recognizing the duty that Moran imposes upon a board
wishing to adopt a defensive mechanism, directors should realize that prop-
erly adopting a purchase rights plan will not ensure the validity of the
subsequent use of the plan to thwart a specific tender offer. 56 The Moran
court specifically stated that the court was endorsing only the present
adoption of the Rights Plan, which the Household board undertook as a
preventive, pre-tender offer defense. 57 The Moran court observed that in the
event of an ultimate takeover bid and request to redeem the rights, the
Household board still would have to satisfy its fiduciary duties to both the
corporation and the Household shareholders.5 8 While Household's initial
adoption of the Rights Plan survived judicial scrutiny, the Household board
would have to show that the decision not to redeem the rights in response
149. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (directors must analyze nature of takeover bid and
potential effect on corporate enterprise); supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing duty
of directors to demonstrate reasonableness of takeover defense in light of threat to corporation).
150. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing
allocation of burden of persuasion under business judgment rule in Unocal and Moran).
151. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. See supra note 33 (discussing judicial application of business
judgment rule).
152. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55 (pursuing initial judicial inquiry of board's action
when board addresses pending takeover bid).
153. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356 (demanding enhanced duty of board to show reasona-
bleness of antitakeover mechanism when directors act prospectively to thwart potential takeover
attempts).
154. See id. at 1350 (discussing applicability of business judgment rule to prospective
takeover defense).
155. See id. at 1356-57 (requiring Household directors to demonstrate ratinal basis for
adopting Rights Plan); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55 (inquiring into board's reasons for com-
mencing selective tender offer); supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing Household's
basis for adopting Rights Plan).
156. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354, 1357 (court will judge ultimate response to takeover
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to a pending tender offer and a request to redeem was in the best interests
of the corporation and shareholders. 1S9 Thus, a court relying on Moran could
find that a board of directors' failure to redeem poison pill warrants in the
face of certain takeover bids violated the directors' fiduciary duties to the
corporation and shareholders. 16
The Delaware Supreme Court had the opportunity to examine the
responsibilities of a board when faced with an active hostile takeover bid in
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc. 161 In Revlon, the court
upheld the Revlon Board's adoption of a poison pill purchase rights plan, 62
but intimated that the court would not allow the warrants in Revlon to
obviate the bidding process for Revlon stock.' 63 In Revlon, Pantry Pride,
Inc. (Pantry Pride) expressed an interest to Revlon, Inc. (Revlon) in consum-
mating a friendly acquisition of Revlon.'" In response to Pantry Pride's over-
tures concerning the purchase of Revlon, the Revlon board adopted a takeover
defense plan, part of which included a poison pill rights plan (Revlon Rights
Plan) similar to the Rights Plan in Moran. 65 Under the Revlon Rights Plan,
the Revlon board distributed a dividend of one note purchase right for each
share of Revlon common stock outstanding. 66 Each right entitled a holder
to exchange one share of Revlon common stock for a sixty-five dollar
principal amount of Revlon notes that yielded twelve percent interest and
159. See id. (Moran court's endorsement of Household Rights Plan adoption will not
relieve directors of fiduciary obligations in addressing actual takeover bid); Unocal, 493 A.2d
at 954 (board has duty to determine whether tender offer serves interests of corporation and
shareholders).
160. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354, 1357. According to Moran, a board's decision not to
redeem poison pill warrants in response to a tender offer and request to redeem the warrants is
an issue separate from the board's initial adoption of a purchase price plan. Id.; see supra notes
156-59 and accompanying text (discussing limitation of Moran's endorsement of Rights Plan).
After a board has adopted a purchase rights plan, the directors' consideration of whether to
redeem the warrants in the face of a tender offer and request to redeem is similar to a board's
consideration of a proposed merger or other form of business combination. See Nat'l L.J.,
May 27, 1985, at 19, col. 1 (purchase rights plans subject takeover offers to directors' prior
approval). Thus, if a board rejects a bidder's request to redeem the rights, the directors
presumably would have to demonstrate that rejecting the request was the product of an informed
decision-making process, and that the directors acted in good faith and in the belief that
redeeming the rights was not in the stockholders' best interests. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357
(directors must comply with fiduciary duties in using purchase rights plan); supra notes 105-07
and accompanying text (discussing director's duty to reach informed decision regarding takeover
bid); supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (discussing directors' fiduciary duties); supra
note 33 (same).
161. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
162. See id. at 180-81 (adopting note purchase rights plan falls under business judgment
rule as defensive mechanism designed to enhance board's negotiating ability and protect
corporate entity against legitimate threat).
163. See infra notes 200-18 and accompanying text (discussing court's disposition of
antitakeover measures in Revlon).
164. Revlon, 501 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Del. Ch. 1985).
165. See id. at 1244 (Revlon board adopted note purchase rights plan).
166. Id. at 1243.
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matured in one year. 67 The rightsholders could exercise the note purchase
rights when a person or group acquired twenty percent of Revlon's outstand-
ing stock, unless the acquiror agreed to purchase Revlon's shares for sixty-
five dollars or more.tes The plan precluded an acquiror from exercising any
rights. 69 Under the Revlon Rights Plan, the Revlon board could redeem the
rights for ten cents each at the board's option prior to a twenty percent
acquisition of Revlon's stock. 170 The function of the note purchase rights
was to preclude tender offers of less than sixty-five dollars per share and to
facilitate the likelihood of a negotiated tender offer.'7 ' If an offeror purchased
more than twenty percent of Revlon's outstanding stock and refused to pay
at least sixty-five dollars per share, the Revlon rights would activate-and
allow rightsholders to exchange equity for favorably structured debt.72 If an
offeror proceeded to consummate a merger with Revlon, then the surviving
entity incurred outstanding debt securities, assuming that Revlon stockholders
exercised the Revlon rights upon activation.
73
Subsequent to Revlon's adoption of the Revlon Rights Plan, Pantry
Pride offered to purchase any or all shares of Revlon subject to, among
other things, the recission, redemption, or voiding of the Revlon Rights
Plan. '74 Revlon reacted by offering Revlon shareholders an exchange of
Revlon notes (Exchange Notes). 175 Revlon shareholders responded by tend-
ering ten million shares of Revlon's common stock in exchange for Revlon's
notes. 76 Afterward, while Pantry Pride commenced a second tender offer,
Revlon pursued Forstman Little & Co. (Fortsman Little) as a white knight
167. Id.
168. See id. The acquisition of 20% or more of Revlon common stock in Revlon triggered
the rights under the Revlon Rights Plan. Id. An acquiror of 20% or more of Revlon stock
would not trigger the rights, however, if the acquiror promptly purchased Revlon's common
stock for at least $65 cash. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1244.
171. See id. The Revlon board intended the Revlon Rights Plan in Revlon to prevent tender
offers of less than $65 per share and to strengthen the board's bargaining position in relation
to potential acquirors. Id.
172. Id. at 1243. See supra text accompanying notes 166-71 (discussing note purchase rights
under Revlon Rights Plan).
173. See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1243 (discussing Revlon Rights Plan).
174. See id. at 1244. After the Revlon board approved the Revlon Rights Plan, Pantry
Pride commenced a tender offer for any and all shares of Revlon common stock at $47.50 per
share in Revlon. Id. Pantry Pride's tender offer called for the Revlon board to redeem, rescind,
or void the note purchase rights. Id.
175. See id. In response to Pantry Pride's initial tender offer in Revlon for any or all
shares of Revlon, Revlon self-tendered for its common stock. Id. In the exchange proposal,
Revlon offered its stockholders notes (Exchange Notes) in principal amounts of $47.50 that
bore 11.75% interest and matured in 10 years, as well as one-tenth of a share of $9.00
Cumulative Convertible Exchangeable Preferred stock with a value of $100 per share, for each
share of common stock that Revlon shareholders tendered to Revlon. Id. In addition, the
Exchange Notes contained covenants that severely restricted Revlon's ability to incur debt, sell
assets, and pay dividends without the approval of Revlon's independent directors. Id.
176. Id.
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and on October 3, 1985, approved a plan to enter into a leveraged buyout
agreement with Forstman Little that would give Revlon shareholders fifty-
six dollars per share and allow Revlon management a twenty-five percent
equity participation. 7 7 In addition, Revlon agreed to redeem the purchase
rights for Forstman Little or any other offer for Revlon's stock that exceeded
fifty-six dollars cash.'7 8 Pantry Pride immediately raised its offer for Revlon
to fifty-six dollars and twenty-five cents per share and indicated that it would
counter each Forstman Little offer with a nominal increase. 79 The Revlon
board on October 12, 1985, decided to accept an amended Forstman Little
merger offer for fifty-seven dollars and twenty-five cents per share of
Revlon. 80 The merger agreement provided for the redemption of the Revlon
note purchase rights, the recission of the covenants on the Exchange Notes, 8'
a "lock-up" option' 2 for Forstman Little to purchase two profitable divisions
of Revlon,'8 3 a twenty-five million dollar cancellation fee, 8 4 and a no-shop
provision' 5 for Forstman Little.' 86 Finally, the agreement precluded any
participation by Revlon management in the merger. 8 7 In return, Forstman
Little offered to replace the Exchange Notes with new senior subordinated
177. Id. at 1245.
178. Id. Under the proposed leveraged buyout agreement in Revlon between Revlon and
Forstman Little, Forstman Little agreed to assume the $475 million debt that Revlon incurred
by issuing the Exchange Notes. Id. See supra text accompanying note 176 (discussing Revlon's
exchange offer). In addition to requiring that Revlon redeem the poison pill purchase rights,
the agreement provided that Revlon would lift certain covenants from the Exchange Notes that
would have limited Revlon's ability to incur debt, sell assets, and pay dividends. Id. Moreover,
Revlon agreed to sell three of its divisions to help finance Forstman Little's leveraged buyout
of Revlon. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1246.
181. See supra note 175 (discussing Exchange Notes in Revlon).
182. See generally Note, "Lock-up Options: Toward a State Law Standard, " 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1068, 1068-69 (1983). In a lock-up option, a target company typically bestows upon a
suitor a favorable option to purchase stock or assets of the target to induce the suitor, rather
than an unwanted raider, to take over the target. Id. at 1068-69.
183. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1245. The lock-up that Revlon granted to Forstman Little in
Revlon allowed Forstman Little to purchase the Vision Care and National Health Laboratories
divisions of Revlon for $525 million. Id. Forstman Little could exercise the lock-up option upon
the acquisition of 40% of Revlon's shares by any acquiror. Id. The $525 million price for the
two divisions of Revlon was $100 to $175 million below the lowest estimate of these divisions
by Revlon's investment banker. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178 (noting that purchase price involved
in Revlon's lock-up option was below estimated value).
184. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1246. The new leveraged buyout agreement in Revlon provided
that Revlon place $25 million in escrow and release the money to Forstman Little if the two
parties did not complete the agreement or if another entity acquired more than 19.9% of
Revlon's stock. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
185. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178 (discussing no-shop provision in Revlon). The no-shop
provision in Revlon's agreement with Forstman Little precluded Revlon from negotiating with
any potential acquirors other than Forstman Little. Id.
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notes to boost the market value of the original Exchange Notes. 8 The
Exchange Notes had decreased in value as a result of Revlon rescinding the
covenants in Revlon's initial leveraged buyout agreement with Forstman
Little, and had prompted holders of the Exchange Notes to threaten the
Revlon board with litigation.'19 Significantly, the Revlon board agreed to
redeem the note purchase rights in response to any offer that surpassed fifty-
seven dollars cash.,90 Six days later, Pantry Pride increased its offer to fifty-
eight dollars cash for any and all shares of Revlon.' 9'
After the Revlon board adopted the note purchase rights plan, Mac-
Andrews Forbes Holdings, Inc., an affiliate of Pantry Pride, filed suit in
the Delaware Court of Chancery to enjoin Revlon from issuing the rights to
Revlon shareholders. '92 Upon Revlon's announcement of the amended lever-
aged buyout agreement with Forstman Little, Pantry Pride added claims
against Revlon and Forstman Little challenging the lock-up option, no-shop
provision, and cancellation fee, and continued to contest the validity of the
original Revlon Rights Plan.' 93 In challenging the Revlon Rights Plan, Pantry
Pride requested the Delaware Court of Chancery to declare the Revlon Rights
Plan void at the plan's inception.' 94 In addition, Pantry Pride sought a ruling
that the Revlon board effectively had waived the Revlon Rights Plan by
agreeing to redeem the rights for any offer above fifty-seven dollars. 95 The
Delaware Court of Chancery upheld the adoption of the Revlon Rights Plan
under the business judgment rule.' 96 The court disallowed the use of the
warrants, however, as a wrongful obstruction to the bidding for Revlon.'
97
188. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1246.
189. See id. (discussing Forstman Little's offer to support par value of original Exchange
Notes). After Revlon announced the initial leveraged buyout agreement with Forstman Little in
Revlon, holders of the Exchange Notes threatened the Revlon board with litigation over the
decreased value of the Exchange Notes. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178 (Wall Street journal
reported possible lawsuits by Noteholders).
190. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1246.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1242.
193. See id. at 1242, 1246 (discussing Pantry Pride's complaint against Revlon's defensive
measures).
194. Id. at 1246.
195. Id. See supra text accompanying note 190 (discussing Revlon's agreement to redeem
purchase rights).
196. See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1247 (discussing Revlon's adoption of poison pill in light of
Pantry Pride's takeover intimations).
197. See id. The Delaware Court of Chancery in Revlon found that in adopting the poison
pill warrants, the Revlon Board had reached the extent of plenary negotiating authority that
Moran allowed. Id. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del. Ch. 1985)
(Household Rights Plan allows board to act as primary negotiator of tender offers). But see
supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing Delaware Supreme Court's rejection in
Moran of argument that Rights Plan accorded board plenary negotiating authority in tender
offers). The Court of Chancery in Revlon maintained that implementing the note purchase
rights effectively would substitute the Revlon board for the marketplace as a judge of tender
offers for Revlon shares, and refused to allow the board to use the Revlon Rights Plan to
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Similarly, the court enjoined Revlon's lock-up option, no-shop clause, and
cancellation fee as a breach of the board's duty of loyalty to Revlon
shareholders. 19 The court concluded that instead of attempting to obtain the
highest possible price for Revlon stock, the Revlon board effectively termi-
nated the bidding for Revlon by implementing defensive measures in an
effort to alleviate the threat of litigation by holders of the Exchange Notes. 99
In considering the validity of the Revlon Rights Plan, the Delaware
Supreme Court in Revlon first assessed the applicability of the business
judgment rule to the Revlon Board's adoption of the note purchase rights
plan.200 The Revlon court found that the Revlon board properly had adopted
the Revlon Rights Plan as a defense against the threat of a takeover that the
board perceived as detrimental to corporate interests. 201 The court found that
the Revlon board's concern over the possibility of Pantry Pride offering an
inadequate price for Revlon, financing a takeover with "junk bonds, ' 20 2 and
subsequently breaking up the assets of Revlon was sufficient to show that
the Revlon board acted reasonably in response to a valid danger to Revlon. 203
The court concluded, therefore, that the Revlon board had satisfied the
board's fiduciary duty under Unocal to demonstrate the warrants'
reasonableness 2O4 and thus granted the protection of the business judgment
rule to Revlon's adoption of the purchase rights.
20 5
While the Revlon court accorded the protection of the business judgment
rule to the Revlon board's adoption of the purchase rights plan, the court
found that the Revlon directors had rendered moot the issue of the warrants'
propriety by agreeing to redeem the rights for Forstman Little and any other
offer above fifty-seven dollars for Revlon stock. 206 The court found that the
thwart potentially favorable tender offers once the sale of Revlon became imminent. See Revlon,
501 A.2d at 1248, 1250-51 (requiring Revlon board to promote bids once directors acknowledged
eventual sale of company).
198. See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1250-52 (disallowing use of Revlon's antitakeover defenses
against Pantry Pride).
199. See id. at 1250 (discussing Revlon board's self-interest in accommodating Forstman
Little); supra notes 188-89 (Revlon accepted Forstman Little's offer which would raise value of
Exchange Notes).
200. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179-80.
201. See id. at 180-81 (discussing Revlon board's adoption of rights plan).
202. See Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities-An
Update, 40 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1411-12 (1985) (discussing junk bond financing of takeovers).
Junk bonds normally are high yield, low credit bonds that a potential acquiror uses as a revenue
source in financing a takeover. Id. Typically, the acquiror forms a shell acquisition vehicle that
issues the bonds. Id. After consummating the takeover, the acquiror sells or "busts up" the
assets of the target to retire the debt incurred in acquiring the target. Id. at 1412. See supra
note 101 and accompanying text (discussing bootstrap and bust up takeovers).
203. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180-81 (discussing Revlon board's basis for adopting Revlon
Rights Plan).
204. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing board's duty to show
prudence of takeover defense).
205. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181.
206. Id. See supra text accompanying note 190 (Revlon board resolved to redeem rights in
connection with Forstman Little's buyout offer).
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Revlon Rights Plan presented no real obstacle to the bidding for Revlon
because the offers of Forstman Little and Pantry Pride eventually exceeded
fifty-seven dollars.20 7 The Revlon court maintained, however, that the Revlon
board improperly used the lock-up option, no-shop clause, and cancellation
fee to foreclose further bidding by Pantry Pride.20 8 The court observed that
Revlon's sale became imminent after Pantry Pride had increased its tender
offer for Revlon from fifty to fifty-three dollars per share and after the
Revlon board had authorized Revlon management to negotiate a merger. 209
The court found that once the Revlon board realized that Revlon's breakup
was inevitable, the directors' duty changed from protecting Revlon's corpo-
rate enterprise to auctioning the company at the maximum price per share
for stockholders. 210 The Revlon court maintained that price should have been
the Revlon board's fundamental consideration in responding to the competing
tender offers of Forstman Little and Panty Pride. 21' The court observed that
while not per se illegal, the concessionary lock-up option, no-shop clause,
and cancellation fee effectively had terminated the bidding process for
Revlon. 21 2 The Revlon court found that by precluding Revlon shareholders
form realizing the maximum possible profit from the imminent sale of
Revlon, the Revlon board breached its fundamental duty of care to the




In addition to finding that the Revlon board failed to procure the best
possible sale price for Revlon shareholders, the Revlon court held that the
Revlon board granted the lock-up option to Forstman Little at least partially
on the basis of Forstman Little's promise to reinforce the market value of
Revlon's Exchange Notes. 2 4 In light of the noteholders' prior threats to
bring suit against the Revlon board, the court maintained that the directors
wrongfully permitted a selfish consideration to influence the board's decision
to allow the lock-up option.215 The Revlon court thus maintained that the
board's decision, which the directors made at the expense of shareholders,
constituted a breach of the board's duty of loyalty to Revlon equity owners. 216
207. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181.
208. See infra notes 209-18 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon court's disposition
of lock-up option, no-shop clause, and cancellation fee).
209. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 183 (discussing effect of Revlon's antitakeover measures on bidding for
Revlon).
213. Id. at 185. See supra note 33 (discussing duty of care and business judgment rule).
214. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
215. Id.
216. Id. In ascertaining whether the lock-up option in Revlon deserved the judicial deference
of the business judgment rule, the Revlon court analyzed the board's action under the directors'
duties of care and loyalty. See id. at 184 (defensive measures breached duty of care); id. at 182
(lock-up agreement breached duty of loyalty). More traditional business judgment rule analysis
has separated the duty of care from the duty of loyalty. See supra note 33 (discussing directors'
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Recognizing that no rationally related benefit from the board's action accrued
to Revlon's principal constituency, the Revlon shareholders, the court refuted
Revlon's argument that protecting the interests of the noteholders was a
legitimate concern of the Revlon board.2 17 The Revlon court reasoned that
the adverse effect of the lock-up option on shareholders outweighed the
importance of protecting another corporate constituency, the Revlon note-
holders.218
Although the Delaware Supreme Court deemed moot the issue of the
poison pill warrants under Revlon's particular facts, Revlon remains signif-
icant to corporate directors who are considering adopting a poison pill.219 In
determining the validity of the lock-up option, no-shop clause, and cancel-
lation fee in Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed for the first
time under Delaware law a board's adoption of these defensive measures in
response to an impending struggle for corporate control. 20 Presumably the
Revlon court would have applied the court's analysis of directors' responsi-
bilities to the Revlon Rights Plan had the Revlon board not agreed to redeem
the rights for all pertinent bidders in Revlon.221 While the Revlon court
accorded the protection of the business judgment rule to the Revlon board's
adoption of the note purchase rights plan, Revlon may have undermined the
general efficacy of a poison pill rights defense by disallowing Revlon to
implement the lock-up option, no-shop clause, and cancellation fee after
Forstman Little and Pantry Pride had intensified the bidding for Revlon.m
While the mere presence of poison pill warrants in a corporation's financial
structure may benefit a company that wishes to prevent unsolicited takeo-
vers,23 a board's adoption of a rights plan presumably connotes that board's
desire to allow the plan to take effect against a hostile acquiror should the
board deem this necessary. Revlon, however, suggests that a board's refusal
to redeem poison pill warrants may result in a breach of the board's fiduciary
duties to shareholders if two or more bidders actively are pursuing the
duties of care and loyalty). The validity of the lock-up option in Revlon primarily appears to
turn on the issue of good faith. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (preferential consideration of
noteholders prevented board from satisfying good faith element of business judgment rule).
The Revlon court found that by considering the threat of noteholder litigation in the decision
to grant the lock-up option to Forstman Little, the Revlon board breached the board's duty of
loyalty and negated the good faith presumption of the business judgment rule. Id.
217. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. See also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (noting that directors may
consider the impact of takeover bid on constituencies other than shareholders).
218. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (concern for nonshareholder interest inappropriate when
board's duty is to sell company at highest possible price).
219. See infra notes 222-27 and accompanying text (discussing relevance of Revlon to
directors' use of poison pill).
220. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176.
221. See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1247, 1251 (disallowing use of Revlon Rights Plan).
222. See infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon's limitations on use
of poison pill warrants).
223. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (possessing rights plan may induce hostile
raiders to negotiate with target prior to takeover bid).
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company. 224 Concerning the validity of poison pill purchase rights, Revlon
appears to stand for the proposition that once the bidding process for a
target company has reached the point when the sale of the company is
imminent, courts should not permit a board to implement a purchase rights
plan that in a discriminatory manner retards market forces and undermines
the ability of the target's shareholders to receive the highest possible price
for the target's stock. 25 Although the purchase rights plan in Revlon did not
inhibit the bidding for Revlon, any concessionary redemption of the rights
by the Revlon board in favor of Forstman Little and to the exclusion of
Pantry Pride would have assisted in eroding the protection of the business
judgment rule regarding the Revlon board's response to the competing tender
offers.
226
Revlon's implied limitation on the use of poison pill warrants is consistent
with the validation of the Household Rights Plan in Moran.227 Both the
Revlon and Moran courts endorsed the adoption of similar defensive rights
plans. 228 The Household board in Moran, however, unlike the board in
Revlon, was not facing a situation in which active bidding for the company
had begun when the board adopted the Rights Plan.229 Yet the Moran court
specifically stated that judicial approval of a board's adoption of a purchase
rights plan would not absolve directors of their fiduciary duties in considering
a specific takeover bid and request to redeem the warrants. 230 Revlon thus
appears to manifest the Moran court's admonition by impliedly prohibiting
a board from implementing an auction-ending purchase rights plan.
23'
In light of Moran and Revlon, the prospective adoption of a poison pill
rights plan appears safe for boards of directors. 2 2 Presumably, courts will
224. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184 (disallowing Revlon's lock-up option, no-shop agreement,
and cancellation fee); supra notes 208-18 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon's preclusion
of antitakeover measures).
225. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (inevitability of company's sale renders moot issue of
defensive measures because board's duty becomes that of auctioneer).
226. See id. at 184 (refusing to defer to Revlon board's decision to implement defensive
mechanisms).
227. See infra notes 228-31 and accompanying text (reconciling treatment of rights plans
in Moran and Revlon).
228. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180-81 (according protection of business judgment rule to
adoption of Revlon Rights Plan); supra notes 200-05 (discussing Revlon court's upholding of
Revlon board's decision to adopt rights plan under business judgment rule); Moran 500 A.2d
at 1357 (endorsing Household board's adoption of poison pill warrants under business judgment
rule); supra notes 99-101 (discussing Household board's compliance with requirements of
business judgment rule).
229. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357.
230. Id. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (discussing Moran court's limited
endorsement of Household Rights Plan).
231. See supra notes 219-26 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon court's restrictions
on use of rights plan).
232. See supra notes 93-111 and accompanying text (discussing Moran court's protection
of Household Rights Plan under business judgment rule); supra notes 200-05 (discussing Revlon
court's endorsement of Revlon Rights Plan under business judgment rule).
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accord the presumptions of good faith, honesty, and well-founded decisions233
under the business judgment rule to a board's decision to adopt a preplanned
defensive stock purchase rights plan, provided that a board can show initially
that the defensive mechanism was a reasonable means to counter a viable
threat to the corporation, as long as the sale of the company is not
inevitable.2 14 A general concern about the coercive nature of the present
takeover market appears to constitute sufficient reasonable grounds to adopt
the prospective takeover defense as required by Delaware courts. 5 As long
as a board acts on an informed basis,2 6 therefore, the business judgment
rule should protect the board's decision to adopt a purchase rights plan. 7
While Moran and Revlon appear to endorse the adoption of poison pill
warrants, the cases highlight the importance of the manner in which a board
uses a takeover defense, including a purchase rights plan. 38 The Delaware
Supreme Court appears to have legitimized implementing poison pill warrants
to preserve a target's corporate entity, at least until bidding for the target
reaches a level at which the target's sale is imminent.2?9 By deterring heated
bidding from potential acquirors, a poison pill may enable a board to avoid-
reaching a point of imminent breakup. 240 If the pill cannot dissuade resolute
competition for the target, however, Revlon clearly demands that the board
view its primary role as that of an auctioneer, and attempt to secure the
highest possible dollar amount per share for the company's shareholders.2 4'
Additionally, directors must take care not to allow selfish considerations to
enter into a decision concerning an antitakeover measure in the heat of a
tender offer, especially since Revlon indicated that courts should not accord
the protection of the business judgment rule to decisions tainted with director
self-interest. 247 After Moran and Revlon, therefore, Delaware courts will
judge a board's implementation of a purchase rights plan in the context of
each specific takeover offer and each request to redeem or rescind the
233. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 817 (Del. 19,84) (discussing presumptions that
business judgment rule accords to directors); supra note 33 (discussing judicial application of
business judgment rule).
234. See supra notes 92-98, 200-05 and accompanying text (discussing directors' compliance
with burdens of persuasion in Moran and Revlon).
235. See supra notes 99-101, 202-03 and accompanying text (discussing directors' bases for
adopting poison pill plans in Moran and Revlon).
236. See supra notes 105-08 (discussing board's duty to render informed decisions).
237. See supra notes 92-111, 200-05 and accompanying text (discussing judicial validation
of rights plans under business judgment rule in Moran and Revlon)-
238. See supra notes 156-60, 219-26 and accompanying text (delineating standards for use
of defensive measures against impending takeover threat).
239. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (discussing altered duty of directors once company
reaches brink of auction).
240. See supra notes 9, 24 and accompanying text (discussing deterrent effect of purchase
rights plan on potential acquirors).
241. See supra notes 208-18, 222-26 and accompanying text (discussing directors' duty in
response to inevitable sale of company). .
242. See supra notes 214-18 (discussing Revlon's incorporation of director self-interest into
business judgment rule analysis).
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rights.243 Accordingly, the valid existence of poison pill warrants in a target
corporation's arsenal of takeover defenses will not allow the corporation's
board to use the poison pill with impunity to thwart the bidding process for
the target's stock.
J. CuRTis HENDERSON
243. See supra notes 156-60, 219-26 and accompanying text (discussing significance of
Moran and Revlon on directors' duties to stockholders in implementing poison pill rights plan
in response to hostile tender offer).
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